IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v16y2004i2p107-141.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence

Author

Listed:
  • Frank C. Zagare

Abstract

This article argues that classical (or rational) deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate and prescriptively deficient. In its stead it offers an alternative theoretical framework – perfect deterrence theory – that makes consistent use of the rationality postulate and is in accord with the empirical literature of deterrence. Perfect deterrence theory’s axiomatic base, its empirical expectations and its most significant policy prescriptions are highlighted and contrasted with those of classical deterrence theory. The theory’s implications for current policy debates about a national missile defense system, arms control, US policy toward China and Russia, and inter-state negotiations in general, are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank C. Zagare, 2004. "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 107-141, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:107-141
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629804041117
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629804041117
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951629804041117?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Powell, Robert, 1987. "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(3), pages 717-735, September.
    2. Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, 1987. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?," International Economic Association Series, in: Christian Schmidt (ed.), The Economics of Military Expenditures, chapter 9, pages 180-196, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Michael Intriligator & Dagobert Brito, 1981. "Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 247-260, January.
    4. Levy, Jack S., 1988. "When Do Deterrent Threats Work?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 485-512, October.
    5. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
    6. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Morrow, James D. & Zorick, Ethan R., 1997. "Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 15-27, March.
    7. Waltz, Kenneth N., 1990. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 730-745, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Winning with the Bomb," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 278-301, April.
    2. HEIFETZ, Aviad & SEGEV, Ella, 2003. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella, 2005. "Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 17-37, January.
    4. Suzanne Werner, 1999. "Choosing Demands Strategically," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(6), pages 705-726, December.
    5. David Brulé, 2006. "Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(4), pages 463-483, August.
    6. Mark Reitman, 1987. "Toward the Global Optimization Model of Peace Defense," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(3), pages 525-542, September.
    7. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Nuclear Weapons as Shields," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(3), pages 235-255, July.
    8. Dong-Joon Jo & Erik Gartzke, 2007. "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 167-194, February.
    9. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 520-534, August.
    10. Alexander H. Montgomery & Scott D. Sagan, 2009. "The Perils of Predicting Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 302-328, April.
    11. David H. Clark & Patrick M. Regan, 2003. "Opportunities to Fight," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 47(1), pages 94-115, February.
    12. Nakao, Keisuke, 2022. "Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?," MPRA Paper 112849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Murray Wolfson, 1987. "A theorem on the existence of zones of initiation and deterrence in Intriligator-Brito arms race models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 291-297, August.
    14. Eelco van der Maat, 2011. "Sleeping hegemons: Third-party intervention following territorial integrity transgressions," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(2), pages 201-215, March.
    15. Kyungwon Suh, 2023. "Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 60(2), pages 337-351, March.
    16. Lisa J. Carlson, 1995. "A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 511-534, September.
    17. John S. Odell, 2003. "Making and Breaking Impasses in International Regimes. The WTO, Seattle and Doha," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 1, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    18. Kilgour D. Marc & Zagare Frank C., 2001. "The Impact of Conventional Force Reductions on Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-26, April.
    19. Kim, Jin Yeub, 2018. "Counterthreat of attack to deter aggression," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 112-114.
    20. Kyungkook Kang & Jacek Kugler, 2015. "Assessment of deterrence and missile defense in East Asia: A power transition perspective," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 280-296, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:107-141. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.