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Explaining the Growth of Social Benefits in Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1960–80

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  • V A Mahler

    (Department of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60626, USA)

Abstract

A number of political, economic, and demographic explanations are considered for the expansion of public social benefits in the advanced capitalist countries in recent decades. These explanations are then assessed empirically, by means of a pooled regression analysis, with reference to seventeen OECD countries over the period from 1960 to 1980. The study reveals that the most powerful factor in explaining the growth of public social expenditures is the proportion of the population that is elderly. Weaker, but statistically significant, positive relationships are also found linking public social benefits to electoral turnout, levels of unemployment and inflation, and dependence on foreign trade. There is little evidence of trade-offs between benefit expenditures and expenditures for defense. Nor is there a significant relationship between benefit expenditures and the self-interest of bureaucrats administering programs, the extent of unionization, or the partisan orientation of the national legislature.

Suggested Citation

  • V A Mahler, 1990. "Explaining the Growth of Social Benefits in Advanced Capitalist Countries, 1960–80," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 8(1), pages 13-28, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:envirc:v:8:y:1990:i:1:p:13-28
    DOI: 10.1068/c080013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lindbeck, Assar, 1976. "Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 1-19, May.
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