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What Limits Decentralization at Russian Firms?
[Что Ограничивает Децентрализацию На Российских Фирмах?]

Author

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  • Levina, Irina A. (Левина, Ирина)

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The paper investigates the influence of institutional factors on decentralization of decision-making at Russian firms. Decentralization is important for firms’ growth and development. While in the absence of decentralization a firm’s growth opportunities are limited by time and abilities of its CEO, decentralization opens doors for quicker decision-making on a larger range of questions and creates room for the firm’s growth. However, decentralization is associated with agency risks and risks of information leakage. Weak judicial system, high corruption, and low level of trust increase risks associated with decentralization and, therefore, can significantly limit firms’ opportunities for decentralization. In this paper the author empirically explores the influence of corruption, quality of court system and trust on decentralization of decision-making at firms in the Russian regions. The empirical analysis presented in the paper demonstrates the important limiting influence of corruption on decentralization of decision-making at Russian firms. In the regions with higher corruption firms are less likely to decentralize and more likely to choose a management model with centralized decision-making and selection of people for top positions through connections. At the same time, the presented analysis does not reveal any significant influence of the court system’s quality or the level of trust in the Russian regions on the probability of decentralization at Russian firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Levina, Irina A. (Левина, Ирина), 2017. "What Limits Decentralization at Russian Firms? [Что Ограничивает Децентрализацию На Российских Фирмах?]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 5, pages 62-79, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1754
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Levina, Irina, 2020. "Decentralization of firms in a country with weak institutions: Evidence from Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 933-950.
    2. Irina Levina, 2018. "Decentralization of Firms in a Country with Weak Institutions: Evidence from Russia," Working Papers 375, Leibniz Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and Southeast European Studies).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    decentralization of decision-making; hiring for top positions; quality of institutions; corruption.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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