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Incentives for cooperative-specific investments from court decisions to the theoretical analysis


  • Agamirova, Maria

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Dzagurova, Natalia

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)


It is believed that theoretical research have a significant impact on the norms of antimonopoly regulation and enforcement practices. However, detailed analysis shows that these ideas do not correspond to the actual sequence of events. In this paper we focus on a relatively narrow area, in which the role of theoretical analysis recognizes extremely important - namely, in the antitrust regulation limiting vertical agreements (BOC). Comparative analysis of the time change regulations BOC and the emergence of theoretical concepts, which are now widely used to justify the need for such changes suggests that the development of the theory not only led to a change in regulatory regimes BOC, but, rather, is itself based on the discussions related antitrust proceedings .

Suggested Citation

  • Agamirova, Maria & Dzagurova, Natalia, 2014. "Incentives for cooperative-specific investments from court decisions to the theoretical analysis," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, pages 79-97.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1440

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    References listed on IDEAS

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