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Impôt négatif, salaire minimum et chômage dans un modèle d’appariement avec différenciation des agents

Listed author(s):
  • Lages Dos Santos, Pedro

    (CERENE, Université du Havre)

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    This article is part of a larger analysis of the reform of the French social benefit system. It studies a measure thought to improve the situation of the poorest while favoring an “incentive to work” effect, i.e. the Negative Income Tax. We study more acutely the coexistence of this instrument of economic policy with a minimum wage. We use a matching model à la Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) based on an explicit horizontal differentiation of workers and jobs. We show that the introduction of a minimum wage improves matching between workers and jobs, making “bad” matches unrealizable. Thus, the labor market is more efficient and the Negative Income Tax reduces inequalities and poverty. However, the policy looses its “incentive to work” effect. Cet article s’inscrit dans une réflexion assez large sur la refonte du système de prestations sociales français. Il s’intéresse en effet à l’une des mesures évoquées afin d’améliorer la situation des plus démunis tout en favorisant un effet « prime à l’emploi », à savoir l’impôt négatif. Nous analysons plus particulièrement la coexistence d’un tel instrument de politique économique avec une législation relative à un revenu minimum. Pour cela, nous utilisons comme cadre d’analyse un modèle d’appariement à la Marimon et Zilibotti (1999) qui repose sur une différenciation explicite des travailleurs et des emplois. L’introduction d’un salaire minimum a pour effet d’améliorer l’adéquation entre les travailleurs et les emplois en rendant les « mauvais » appariements impossibles. Cependant, le gain en termes d’efficacité du marché du travail s’obtient aux dépens de l’effet « prime à l’emploi » de la politique envisagée, mais sans réduire les effets positifs en termes de lutte contre les inégalités et la pauvreté.

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    Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

    Volume (Year): 84 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (mars)
    Pages: 47-70

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    Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:84:y:2008:i:1:p:47-70
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    1. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, January.
    2. Card, David & Krueger, Alan B, 1994. "Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 772-793, September.
    3. Alan Manning, 1995. "How Do We Know That Real Wages Are Too High?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1111-1125.
    4. Machin, Stephen & Manning, Alan, 1997. "Minimum wages and economic outcomes in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 733-742, April.
    5. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    6. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 1995. "The consequences of minimum wage laws Some new theoretical ideas," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 245-255, February.
    7. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 266-291, April.
    8. Albrecht, James W. & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan B., 2003. "Matching with multiple applications," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 67-70, January.
    9. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 2000. "Productivity gains from unemployment insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1195-1224, June.
    10. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    11. Lang, Kevin & Kahn, Shulamit, 1998. "The effect of minimum-wage laws on the distribution of employment: theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 67-82, July.
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