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Imperative Strategic Planning as Improvement of the Decision Making of Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Nasser Fegh-hi Farahmand

    (Department of Management, Tabriz Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran)

Abstract

Imperative strategic planning in organizations regarded as a tool for organizations’ growth and profitability, strategic innovation, organizational and customer-oriented changes. This article attempts to explain the imperative strategic plan collective by patterns of thinking. The importance of strategic, long-term policy and imperative strategic plan collective is very clear to planners. Imperative strategic managers like to follow a similar and routine imperative strategic behavioral pattern. Imperative strategic plan collective, normally taken, as a part of imperative strategic planning, therefore also tends to run in cycles of around last years. Implementing tailored organization can give a competitive advantage and help foster goodwill toward imperative strategic planning approach. Studies on corporate organizational imperative strategic have possessed an increasing growth. This paper proposes a learning organization expectations method that considers tailored organization s information. In today’s tailored organization al environment, there are usually several products and services to fulfill certain functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Nasser Fegh-hi Farahmand, 2016. "Imperative Strategic Planning as Improvement of the Decision Making of Organization," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 5(1), pages 10-19, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:rfh:bbejor:v:5:y:2016:i:1:p:10-19
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    organizational imperative strategic; takes advantage plan; takes advantage of an opportunity; tailored organization; and learning organization; takes advantage of an opportunity approach;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other

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