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Las FARC y los costos del secuestro


  • Maria del Pilar Castillo
  • Giácomo Balbinotto


Con ayuda de la teoría de la agencia, este artículo analiza los efectos del secuestro político como estrategia de largo plazo en la estructura organizativa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, y de la larga duración de los secuestros impuesta por la decisión del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe de no aceptar el intercambio de prisioneros, que en conjunto produjeron una divergencia entre los objetivos de la cúpula y los de sus combatientes. Así, el problema de riesgo moral se hizo más fuerte y dañino con el paso del tiempo.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria del Pilar Castillo & Giácomo Balbinotto, 2012. "Las FARC y los costos del secuestro," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 14(27), pages 147-164, July-Dece.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:14:y:2012:i:27:p:147-164

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Maria del Pilar Castillo & Giácomo Balbinotto N., 2017. "A model of desertion. From a principal-agent theory perspective," REVISTA CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA, UN - RCE - CID, vol. 36(70), pages 19-47, January.

    More about this item


    teoría de la agencia; secuestro; contratos;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law


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