IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/psl/bnlqrr/199544.html

Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board

Author

Listed:
  • J.B CRIHFIELD

    (Barents Group)

  • J.H. WOOD

    (Wake Forest University)

Abstract

The nature of and need to understand economic regulation are discussed. The paper presents further evidence on the relationship between monetary policy and the personal costs and benefits of inflation to central bankers. It is found that resignations from the Federal Reserve Board have been connected to significantly substantial deteriorations in Board salaries in relation to private sector incomes caused by above-average inflation. This is especially true of members whose job backgrounds and ages have allowed easiest access to substantial private incomes.

Suggested Citation

  • J.B Crihfield & J.H. Wood, 1995. "Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(195), pages 441-460.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1995:44
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10500/10387
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crihfield, John B & Wood, John H, 1993. "Bureaucracy, Altruism, and Monetary Policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 233-247, July.
    2. Boyes, William J & Mounts, William Stewart & Sowell, Clifford, 1988. "The Federal Reserve as a Bureaucracy: An Examination of Expense-Preference Behavior," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 181-190, May.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    4. Nathan Balke & Robert J. Gordon, 1986. "Appendix B: Historical Data," NBER Chapters, in: The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change, pages 781-850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
    6. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    7. Andreas Fischer, 1993. "Inflation Targeting: The New Zealand and Canadian Cases," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, Spring/Su.
    8. Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. J.B Crihfield & J.H. Wood, 1995. "Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(195), pages 441-460.
    2. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Working Papers 238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Boyes, William J. & Mounts, WM. Jr. & Sowell, Clifford & Payne, James E., 1996. "All politics is local: The effect of fiscal and monetary constitutions on economic policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 657-678.
    6. Yoshiharu Oritani, 2010. "Public governance of central banks: an approach from new institutional economics," BIS Working Papers 299, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Wm. Mounts & Clifford Sowell & James Lindley, 1985. "Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 87-94, January.
    8. Jordan, Jerry L. & Luther, William J., 2022. "Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 510-515.
    9. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Stella, Andrea, 2010. "The Politics of Monetary Policy," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 18, pages 1001-1054, Elsevier.
    11. Gruner, Hans Peter, 1997. "A Comparison of Three Institutions for Monetary Policy When Central Bankers Have Private Objectives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 127-143, July.
    12. Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
    13. Gabillon, Emmanuelle & Martimort, David, 2004. "The benefits of central bank's political independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 353-378, April.
    14. Favaretto, Federico & Masciandaro, Donato, 2016. "Doves, hawks and pigeons: Behavioral monetary policy and interest rate inertia," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 50-58.
    15. Donato Masciandaro, 2023. "How Elastic and Predictable Money Should Be: Flexible Monetary Policy Rules from the Great Moderation to the New Normal Times (1993-2023)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23196, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    16. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    17. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    18. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2015. "The Evolution of Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14611.
    19. Davide Debortoli & Aeimit Lakdawala, 2016. "How Credible Is the Federal Reserve? A Structural Estimation of Policy Re-optimizations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 42-76, July.
    20. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1995:44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Carlo D'Ippoliti (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.economiacivile.it .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.