The Federal Reserve as a Bureaucracy: An Examination of Expense-Preference Behavior
In this paper, the Federal Reserve System is viewed as a bureaucracy with a bureau's incentive to increase expenses beyond the profit maximizing point. Moreover, the bureau consists of divisions, the district banks, that exhibit their own expense-prefer ence behavior. An empirical investigation of labor demand by the Boar d and district banks reported in this paper demonstrates that the Fed eral Reserve has engaged in expense-preference behavior and that the centralization of the monetary authority amplified this type of behav ior. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.
Volume (Year): 20 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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