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Building an institutional framework for monetary stability: the case of Italy (1979-1994)

  • F. PASSACANTANDO

    (Banca d'Italia)

Registered author(s):

    Italy's monetary regime has experienced significant developments from 1979 to 1994. The independence of the central bank from the government was strengthened by several reforms. The period under review is characterised by monetary policy consistent with the Italian government's inflation targets following the abandonment of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in Sep. 1992. Factors leading to the replacement of one type of institutional arrangement by another and the effects on monetary policy performance are examined. The steps followed and the problems encountered in implementing a system which would ensure monetary stability are also presented.

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10609/10493
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    Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal BNL Quarterly Review.

    Volume (Year): 49 (1996)
    Issue (Month): 196 ()
    Pages: 83-132

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    Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1996:14
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    1. Svensson, L.E.O., 1993. "Fixed Exchange Rates As a Means to Price Stability: What Have we Learned?," Papers 553, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    2. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
    4. Angeloni, Ignazio, 1994. "The Bank of Italy monthly money market model : Structure and applications," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 387-412, October.
    5. Giovanni Ferri & Carlo Cottarelli & Andrea Generale, 1995. "Bank Lending Rates and Financial Structure in Italy; A Case Study," IMF Working Papers 95/38, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Francesco Giavazzi & Luigi Spaventa, 1990. "The "New" EMS," Working Papers 86, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    7. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
    8. Giovannini, Alberto & Spaventa, Luigi, 1991. "Fiscal Rules in the European Monetary Union: A No-Entry Clause," CEPR Discussion Papers 516, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
    10. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Other publications TiSEM 0401b17a-e2c7-4179-ace9-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Gressani, Daniela & Guiso, Luigi & Visco, Ignazio, 1988. "Disinflation in Italy: An analysis with the econometric model of the bank of Italy," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-203.
    12. Bohn, Henning & Gorton, Gary, 1993. "Coordination Failure, Multiple Equilibria and Economic Institutions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 60(239), pages 257-80, August.
    13. M.A. Akhtar & Howard Howe, 1991. "The political and institutional independence of U.S. monetary policy," Research Paper 9110, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    14. Allan H. Meltzer, 1983. "Monetary Reform in an Uncertain Environment," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 93-120, Spring.
    15. L. Bini Smaghi, 1994. "EMS discipline: did it contribute to inflation convergence?," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(189), pages 187-223.
    16. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-152908 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. L. Bini Smaghi, 1994. "EMS discipline: did it contribute to inflation convergence?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(189), pages 187-223.
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