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Policy-making of the European Central Bank during the crisis: Do personalities matter?

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  • Basham, James
  • Roland, Aanor

Abstract

The European sovereign debt crisis represents an interesting opportunity to investigate the reaction of the European Central Bank as a crisis fighting institution and the importance of central bank personalities in policy execution. Accordingly, this paper aims at investigating to what extent the policy-making of the ECB during the crisis has been influenced by Trichet's and Draghi's different personalities. Based on Friedman's hypothesis that "accidents of personality" have a great impact on the functioning of a rulebased institution, we find that the clear differences in policy-making between Trichet and Draghi can be explained by specific features of their respective personalities. Institutions matter, but so do personalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Basham, James & Roland, Aanor, 2014. "Policy-making of the European Central Bank during the crisis: Do personalities matter?," IPE Working Papers 38/2014, Berlin School of Economics and Law, Institute for International Political Economy (IPE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ipewps:382014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hamza Bennani, 2018. "Media Perception of Fed Chair's Overconfidence and Market Expectations," EconomiX Working Papers 2018-29, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Central Bank; Central Bankers; Personality Theory; European Sovereign Debt Crisis; Monetary Policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook

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