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Wenn Banken sich vergessen ...: Risikoregulierung im internationalen Mehr-Ebenen-System

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  • Lütz, Susanne

Abstract

Globalisierungsprozesse erzeugen Problemlagen, die allein durch nationalstaatliche Intervention nicht mehr zu bewältigen sind. Pessimistische Szenarien schließen daraus auf ein generelles "Steuerungsversagen" des Nationalstaates mit der Folge einer wettbewerblichen Deregulierung von Sicherheitsstandards ("race to the bottom"). Eher optimistische Vertreter des politikwissenschaftlichen "Regimeansatzes" sehen die Aushandlung selbstbindender Lösungen zwischen Vertretern betroffener Territorien als Schlüssel für den Rückgewinn von Problemlösungsfähigkeit an. Der folgende Beitrag zeigt hingegen am Beispiel der Geschichte internationaler Bankenregulierung, daß das internationale Mehr-Ebenen-System vielmehr eine "requisite variety" an institutionellen Problemlösungen bietet. Je nach Art des Finanzrisikos und damit des Regelungsproblems, das sich mit unterschiedlichen Phasen finanzwirtschaftlicher Globalisierung stellt, kann es sich hierbei um international verhandelte Sicherheitsstandards oder um komplexere Mehr-Ebenen-Arrangements handeln, die internationale Koordination mit nationalen Lernprozessen kombinieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Lütz, Susanne, 1998. "Wenn Banken sich vergessen ...: Risikoregulierung im internationalen Mehr-Ebenen-System," MPIfG Discussion Paper 98/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:p0048
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