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Diversité des fiscalités européennes et risques de concurrence fiscale

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  • Réjane Hugounenq
  • Jacques Le Cacheux
  • Thierry Madiès

Abstract

[eng] The adoption of the common currency within a context of European fiscal systems diversity could lead to fierce tax competition. Capital income taxation is at stake. The fiscal gap on the corporate income tax between the European country is measured with the cost of capital concept. We find that it can be superior to 30%. In ail countries income from savings are nearly tax free for non resident thus providing a strong incentive to invest abroad. The European Commission propositions aim at minimising the potential effects of fiscal competition on fiscal deficits rather than focusing on economie efficiency. The Commission proposes a « code de bonne conduite » for the corporate income tax and a minimum « withdrawal » savings income tax. Those propositions will not be efficient unless the unanimity voting rule is reconsidered. If not, fiscal competition will prevail.. JEL Codes : F42, H20, H87 [fre] Les systèmes fiscaux européens sont très diversifiés et bon nombre d'observateurs craignent que la mise en place de l'euro ne favorise une concurrence fiscale accrue entre États-membres. Celle-ci pourrait se traduire à terme par une dégradation des finances publiques, une exonération de fait des bases les plus mobiles avec un report de la charge fiscale sur les bases les moins mobiles, et une perte de souveraineté des États, notamment par rapport à leur capacité à mettre en œuvre des politiques de redistribution. Actuellement, le débat porte essentiellement sur la fiscalité pesant sur les revenus du capital — impôt sur le bénéfice des sociétés et sur les revenus de placement. En effet, ces revenus sont potentiellement mobiles et les écarts de fiscalité, mesurés grâce au calcul de coûts du capital dans le cas de l'impôt sur les sociétés, sont importants — ils peuvent être supérieurs à 30 % dans certains cas. En ce qui concerne les revenus de l'épargne, force est de constater que le jeu auquel se livrent les États tourne à l'absurde : chaque État taxe ses résidents mais n'impose pas les non-résidents dans un contexte où chacun peut aller chez le voisin. Dans ces conditions, la Commission européenne adopte désormais une position plus pragmatique qu'il y a une dizaine d'années où l'objectif était d'harmoniser les fiscalités nationales pour réduire les distorsions de concurrence entre États. L'accent est mis davantage sur le caractère dommageable d'une concurrence fiscale non maîtrisée, comme en témoignent la proposition de directive concernant l'instauration d'une retenue à la source pour les revenus de l'épargne ou l'adoption par les États en 1997 d'un code de bonne conduite. Quoi qu'il en soit, en vertu de la règle de l'unanimité en matière d'harmonisation fiscale, un pays comme le Luxembourg, favorable à la concurrence fiscale compte tenu des règles qui régissent le secret bancaire dans cet État, se trouve en position de leader dans les négociations.

Suggested Citation

  • Réjane Hugounenq & Jacques Le Cacheux & Thierry Madiès, 1999. "Diversité des fiscalités européennes et risques de concurrence fiscale," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 70(1), pages 63-109.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1999_num_70_1_1692
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1999.1692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacques Le Cacheux & Vincent Touzé, 2002. "Les modèles d'équilibre général calculable à générations imbriquées. Enjeux, méthodes et résultats," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 80(1), pages 87-113.
    2. Michaël Zemmour, 2012. "Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12090r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Mar 2013.
    3. Gaël Dupont & Henri Sterdyniak & Jacques Le Cacheux & Vincent Touzé, 2000. "La réforme fiscale en France : bilan et perspectives," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 75(1), pages 183-242.
    4. repec:hal:journl:hal-00677603 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Henri Sterdyniak, 2003. "Les réformes fiscales en Europe, 1992-2002," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 87(4), pages 337-407.
    6. Krogstrup, Signe, 2002. "Public debt asymmetries: the effect on taxes and spending in the European Union," Working Paper Series 0162, European Central Bank.
    7. Jean-Marie Monnier, 2000. "Harmonisation des fiscalités et structures fiscales européennes entre 1988 et 1996," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00677603, HAL.
    8. Christophe Blot, 2002. "Les politiques budgétaires au sein de l’UEM : entre convergence et asymétrie," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 69(5), pages 247-268.
    9. Lammersen, Lothar, 2002. "The Measurement of Effective Tax Rates: Common Themes in Business Management and Economics," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-46, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    10. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Lionel Fontagné & Amina Lahrèche-Revil, 2000. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Prospects for Tax Co-Ordination in Europe," Working Papers 2000-06, CEPII research center.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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