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La privatisation des services publics en Afrique subsaharienne. Enjeux et incertitudes

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  • Patrick Plane

Abstract

[eng] African countries have launched a process of privatization (lato sensu) of their public utilities. We suggest that where there is no transfer of management the strengthening of the private sector may not be sufficient to induce improvement of organizational efficiency. Privatization may apply to a monopoly ; we thus discuss the role of a regulating agency, as well as the importance of trust that stems from reputation effects. Privatization may also involve measures that introduce compe­tition which some African countries have already experienced. [fre] Les services publics africains sont entrés dans une phase de privatisation au sens le plus large du terme. En deçà d'un transfert de la gestion, on suggère que le renforcement du secteur privé n'a pas été suffisant pour susciter une réelle amélioration de l'efficacité organisationnelle. La privatisation peut être conçue en maintenant le monopole ; on discute alors l'intérêt très relatif d'une agence de réglementation, mais aussi le rôle de la confiance fondée sur des effets de réputa­tion. La privatisation peut aussi reposer sur des techniques de démonopolisation dont l'Afrique offre déjà quelques expériences.

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  • Patrick Plane, 1996. "La privatisation des services publics en Afrique subsaharienne. Enjeux et incertitudes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(6), pages 1409-1421.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_6_409856
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409856
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409856
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Krueger, Anne O, 1990. "Government Failures in Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 9-23, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Araujo-Bonjean & Gérard Chambas, 2001. "Le paradoxe de la fiscalité agricole en Afrique subsaharienne," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(168), pages 773-788.
    2. Mohamed Jellal & François-Charles Wolff, 2003. "Privatisation et négociation collective," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 11(1), pages 73-99.
    3. Patrick PLANE, 2003. "Privatisation et réseaux d'électricité en Afrique de l'Ouest francophone : une évaluation rétrospective," Working Papers 200322, CERDI.
    4. Plane, Patrick, 1999. "Privatization, Technical Efficiency and Welfare Consequences: The Case of the Cote d'Ivoire Electricity Company (CIE)," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 343-360, February.
    5. Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002. "Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa: On Factors Affecting Implementation," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-12, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Patrick Plane, 1997. "La privatisation de l'électricité en Côte-d'Ivoire : évaluation et interprétation des premiers résultats," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(152), pages 859-878.

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