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Objectifs politiques et contraintes institutionnelles dans les décisions de politique monétaire : analyse économétrique du cas français (1973.03-1993.12)

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  • Christian Aubin
  • Jean-Dominique Lafay

Abstract

[eng] Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 - 1993.12). This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the possibilities for political manipulation. [fre] Political goals and institutional constraints in monetary policy making : an empirical application to the french case (1973.03 - 1993.12). . This paper tries to evaluate the weight of political influences in French monetary policy choices for the period preceding the implementation of the independence law for the Central Bank (January 1994). The analysis is based on a positive politico-economic model describing the bargaining process between the government and the Central Bank. Empirical estimates show that, at least for the interest rate instrument, political considerations have significantly influenced monetary policy choices for the period preceding the adhesion to the European Monetary System. Afterwards, institutional constraints have strongly reduced the possibilities for political manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Aubin & Jean-Dominique Lafay, 1995. "Objectifs politiques et contraintes institutionnelles dans les décisions de politique monétaire : analyse économétrique du cas français (1973.03-1993.12) ," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 869-878.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_3_409700
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1995.409700
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409700
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andersen, Torben M. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1986. "Coordination of fiscal and monetary policy under different institutional arrangements," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-191.
    2. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Central bank independence and economic performance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue jul, pages 21-36.
    3. Ahmad, Kabir U, 1983. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States: A Comment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(1), pages 173-178, February.
    4. Frey, Bruno S & Schneider, Friedrich, 1978. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 174-183, May.
    5. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    6. Schneider, Friedrich & Frey, Bruno S, 1983. "An Empirical Study of Politico-Economic Interaction in the United States: A Reply," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(1), pages 178-182, February.
    7. Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1981. "Central bank behavior : A positive empirical analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 291-315.
    8. Artus, P., 1994. "Effets internes et internationaux de l'independance des banques centrales," Papers 1994-15-t, Caisse des Depots et Consignations - Cahiers de recherche.
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