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Ciclos electorales en política fiscal

  • Daniel Lema
  • Jorge M. Streb

Primero usamos casos empíricos concretos para motivar la discusión de los ciclos electorales en política fiscal. Luego presentamos una revisión teórica y econométrica de la literatura. Teóricamente, los ciclos se pueden interpretar en términos de un problema de inconsistencia temporal que enfrentan los gobiernos bajo información asimétrica: no es creíble que los gobiernos respeten una regla de presupuesto equilibrado antes de las elecciones, a menos que existan actores de veto legislativos que limiten la discrecionalidad del poder ejecutivo. Empíricamente, esta literatura muestra que aunque los ciclos electorales en política fiscal están presentes en todo tipo de democracias, están condicionados por las características institucionales de cada país.

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Paper provided by Universidad del CEMA in its series CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. with number 514.

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Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:514
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