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Éviter les défaillances bancaires en temps de crise : conséquences à long terme des restructurations du capital des entreprises financières

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  • Patricia Charléty

Abstract

[eng] Avoiding Bank Failures in Times of Crisis : the Long Run Effects of Capital Restructurings in the Financial Sector . Public partial or total acquisitions of bank equity constitute short-term solutions to avoid a series of bankruptcies in the financial sector with their catastrophic consequences for credit and growth. Mergers and acquisitions realized in emergency in the banking and financial sector, often with the help of public authorities, also save companies from failure. The purpose of the article is not to question those political decisions, but to stress that these emergency remedies may have negative consequences for banks and the credit market efficiency, and possibly for the stability of the financial sector in the longer run. . Classification JEL : G32, G33, G34, G35, L21, L22, L25, L43, L44. [fre] Les prises de participations par l’État dans les banques en difficulté constituent une solution à court terme pour éviter les défaillances en chaîne avec leurs conséquences catastrophiques pour le crédit et la croissance. Les rapprochements effectués dans les secteurs bancaire et financier permettent également, souvent avec le soutien des pouvoirs publics, de sauver des entreprises. Sans remettre en question ces choix politiques, on souligne que ces solutions adoptées dans l’urgence peuvent avoir des conséquences négatives à plus long terme sur l’efficacité des banques et du marché du crédit, voire sur la stabilité du secteur financier. . Classification JEL : G32, G33, G34, G35, L21, L22, L25, L43, L44.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Charléty, 2010. "Éviter les défaillances bancaires en temps de crise : conséquences à long terme des restructurations du capital des entreprises financières," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 97(2), pages 143-154.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2010_num_97_2_5396
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2010.5396
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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