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Le « gouvernement » des entreprises publiques

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  • Dominique Bureau

Abstract

[fre] Les problèmes rencontrés dans la gestion publique présentent de nom- breux symptômes communs à ceux qui retiennent l'attention lorsque l'on analyse le gouvernement des entreprises en général. Cette ligne de réflexion conduit à souligner que le gouvernement des entreprises publiques souffre intrinsèquement de l'absence de mesure objective des performances et de ne pouvoir compter que sur le monitoring interne pour « discipliner » leurs dirigeants. Mais il souffre aussi du caractère « multitâches » de leur activité. Il en résulte deux niveaux d'intervention complémentaires : le gouvernement de ces entreprises, et l'organisation de la tutelle. La qualité de l'information financière et comptable est dans tous les cas déterminante et pourrait être favorisée par la mise en place de comités et d'administrateurs « indépendants », transposant au secteur public la démarche du rapport Vié-not pour le secteur privé. Au-delà, le champ des privatisations doit sans doute être réévalué avec soin. Il dépend notamment de la possibilité de mettre en place une régulation tarifaire externe efficace et crédible. [eng] Governance problems that arise in the public sector look like those identified in private companies. Managers own private information and often pursue their own goals. The resolution of this agency problem needs adequate incentives to put managerial objectives into line with those of the firm. Comparison with private firms emphasizes that the governance of the public sector is faced with specific difficulties. Monitoring by the board is quite the only mechanism for controlling management. It suffers also from the lack of accountability of the performances, especially when multiple objectives are assigned to the firm. Moreover the commitment ability of its principal is limited. Hence, it seems that applying Cadbury of Vienot recommendations could improve public sector governance. Beyond this approach, the scope for privatization must be reconsidered. It depends on the feasibility of an efficient external regulation for natural monopolies.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Bureau, 1997. "Le « gouvernement » des entreprises publiques," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(2), pages 57-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1997_num_12_2_1020
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.1997.1020
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1997.1020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-689, May.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
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    1. Patricia Charléty, 2010. "Éviter les défaillances bancaires en temps de crise : conséquences à long terme des restructurations du capital des entreprises financières," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 97(2), pages 143-154.

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