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Les engagements volontaires de l'industrie : un mode original de réglementation environnementale

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  • Peter Bôrkey
  • Matthieu Glachant

Abstract

[eng] In environmental policy, voluntary commitments are increasingly considered as a potentially useful policy tool. They are voluntary commitments by a group of firms (in general, an industrial sector) to reach pollution abatement targets. Two main forms can be distinguished, i.e. voluntary agreements and self regulation, depending on whether the commitments are negotiated or not with the regulator. Using numerous examples, we present their key features and the motives of firms to undertake them. We argue that they are an original mode of regulation including (i) a setting process of social pollution abatement targets where firms play a central role, (ii) a burden sharing scheme of pollution abatement efforts based on inter-firm bargaining and (iii) a very modest formal system of monitoring and enforcement. [fre] Les engagements volontaires sont considérés comme de nouveaux instruments destinés à faire évoluer la politique environnementale à destination des entreprises vers plus de flexibilité et d'incitations. Ils correspondent à des engagements d'un groupe de firmes (en général, un secteur industriel) à atteindre des objectifs de dépollution. Il convient de distinguer deux formes, les accords volontaires et l'auto-réglementation, selon que les engagements aient été négociés ou non avec une autorité publique. À l'aide de nombreux exemples, nous présentons les caractéristiques clés des engagements et les motivations des firmes qui en sont l'origine. Nous montrons que les engagements volontaires constituent un mode original de réglementation incluant : (i) un processus de définition d'objectifs sociaux de dépollution dans lequel le rôle des entreprises est central, (ii) un mode original d'allocation de l'effort de dépollution fondé sur une négociation décentralisée inter-firmes et (iii) un dispositif formel de contrôle des engagements et de sanctions très modestes par rapport aux politiques plus traditionnelles.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Bôrkey & Matthieu Glachant, 1998. "Les engagements volontaires de l'industrie : un mode original de réglementation environnementale," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 83(1), pages 213-224.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_1998_num_83_1_1710
    DOI: 10.3406/rei.1998.1710
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.1998.1710
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
    2. Hansen, Lars Gårn, 1997. "Environmental Regulation through Voluntary Agreements," MPRA Paper 47537, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 1999.
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