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UEM et coordination des politiques budgétaires

Listed author(s):
  • Jean Bensaïd
  • Frédéric Gavrel

[eng] EMU and the Coordination of Budgetary Policies, by Jean Bensaid and Frédéric Gavrel. Although the Maastricht Treaty provides for extremely close co-ordination between the monetary policies of the EMU Member States, it is restricted from a budgetary point of view to regulating the level of deficit and public debt. Yet budgetary policy is the only tool available for countering a macroeconomic shock. This article uses a two-country neo-Keynesian model to show that only supply shocks pose a real problem for the co-ordination of budgetary policies under monetary union. Whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, such shocks necessarily lead to excessive public deficits. This is because the autonomy of budgetary policies prevents the governments from seeing the true inflation/unemployment arbitrage that underlies their decisions. [spa] UEM y coordinación de las políticas presupuestarias, por Jean Bensaid y Frédéric Gavrel. Así como el Tratado de Maestricht prevé una coordinación sumamente estrecha de las politicas monetarias de los estados miembros de la UEM, limita su acción, en matena presupuestaria, a encuadrar el nivel de déficit y de la deuda públicos. No obstante, la política presupuestaria será el único instrumento disponible para oponerse a un choque macroeconómico. El presente artículo tiene por propósito demostrar en el marco de un modelo neokeysiano de dos países que, en unión monetaria, únicamente los impactos de oferta vienen a plantear un verdadero problema de coordinación de las políticas presupuestarias : simétrica o asimétrica, este género de impactos se manifiesta obligatoriamente por déficits públicos excesivos, debido a que la autonomía de las políticas presupuestarias impide a los gobiernos darse cuenta del vadadero arbitraje inflación-desempleo que subtiende sus decisiones. [fre] UEM et coordination des politiques budgétaires, par Jean Bensaid, Frédéric Gavrel. Alors que le traité de Maastricht prévoit une coordination très étroite des politiques monétaires des états membres de l'UEM, il se restreint, en manère budgétaire, à encadrer le niveau du déficit et de la dette publiques. Cependant la politique budgétaire sera le seul instrument disponible pour contrer un choc maao-économique. L'article se propose de montrer dans le cadre d'un modèle néo-keynésien à deux pays que, en union monétaire, seuls les chocs d'offre posent un vrai problème de coordination des politiques budgétaires : symétrique ou asymétrique, de tels chocs se traduisent nécessairement par des déficits publics excessifs, parce que l'autonomie des politiques budgétaires empêche les gouvernements de percevoir le véritable arbitrage inflation-chômage qui sous tend leurs décisions. [ger] WWU und Koordinierung der Haushaltspolitiken, von Jean Bensaid, Frédéric Gavrel. Während der Vertrag von Maastricht eine sehr enge Koordinierung der Währungspolitiken zwischen den WWU-Teilnehmerstaaten vorsieht, macht er in der Haushaltspolitik lediglich eine Plafondierung des öffentlichen Defizits und der Staatsverschuldung zur Auflage. Die Haushaltspolitik ist dann jedoch das einzige Instrument, das zur Abwehr eines gesamtwirtschaftlichen Schocks zur Verfügung steht. In diesem Artikel soil nun im Rahmen eines neokeynesianischen Modells mit zwei Ländern aufgezeigt werden, daß in einer Währungsunion lediglich die Angebotsschocks ein wirkliches Problem bei der Koordinierung der Haushaltspolitiken darstellen; derm solche Schocks, seien sie symmetrischer oder asymmetrischer Art, führen zwangsweise zu übermäßigen öffentlichen Defiziten, da die Unabhängigkeit der Haushaltspolitiken die Regierungen daran hindert, eine wirkliche Arbitration zwischen Inflation und Arbeitslosigkeit zu finden, die ihren Entscheidungen zugrunde liegt.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 109 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 47-56

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1993_num_109_3_5621
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1993.5621
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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Alogoskoufis, George, 1990. "On Relative Shocks and Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 423, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Alogoskoufis, George & Martin, Christopher, 1990. "External Constraints on European Unemployment," CEPR Discussion Papers 469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Franck Amalric & Henri Sterdyniak, 1989. "Interdépendance et coopération : les leçons d'une maquette," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(1), pages 135-156.
  4. van der Ploeg, F., 1990. "Macroeconomic policy coordination during the various phases of economic and monetary integration in Europe," Discussion Paper 1990-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. van der Ploeg, F., 1989. "Fiscal aspects of monetary integration in Europe," Discussion Paper 1989-30, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 1991. "European integration and trade flows," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1295-1309, August.
  7. Cohen, Daniel, 1989. "Monetary and fiscal policy in an open economy with or without policy coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 303-309, March.
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