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Independent director compensation and stock price collapse: Inhibition or promotion—based on a financial background perspective

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  • Guoping Dong
  • Guifen Ma
  • Shanqiu Liu

Abstract

This paper takes the financial independent directors’ compensation of listed companies from 2014 to 2020 as the research object and uses empirical analysis to study whether the compensation of financial independent directors promotes or inhibits stock price collapse. The research results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the compensation of financial independent directors of listed companies and stock price collapse. In state-owned enterprises, the compensation of financial independent directors has an inhibitory effect on stock price collapse, but it is not significant. In non-state-owned enterprises, the compensation of financial independent directors has a significant promoting effect on stock price collapse. Further research finds that the improvement of internal control quality can weaken the promoting effect of financial independent directors’ compensation on stock price collapse to a certain extent, and the weakening effect is particularly evident in non-state-owned enterprises. The attendance frequency of financial independent directors cannot effectively suppress stock price collapse, but instead has a promoting effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Guoping Dong & Guifen Ma & Shanqiu Liu, 2023. "Independent director compensation and stock price collapse: Inhibition or promotion—based on a financial background perspective," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(8), pages 1-18, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0289986
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0289986
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chuan Zhang & Hongdi Nie, 2025. "Does financial asset allocation term structure affect audit fees? Evidence from China," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 20(1), pages 1-16, January.

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