Voluntary Contributions with Uncertainty: The Environmental Quality
This article presents a model in which production causes pollution that diminishes the welfare of its agents. Each agent is concerned with the quality of its environment and may voluntary contribute to improve it by financing depollution technology. The effectiveness of this technology on the quality of the environment is uncertain. We show that if an agent is sufficiently risk averse, voluntary contribution is a decreasing function of the average efficiency of depollution technology. If, on the contrary, the pollution effect is weaker than the substitution effect, the opposite holds. We show that precaution about environmental quality has two possible consequences that depend on agents' risk aversion. Therefore, the implications of a precautionary attitude lead us to consider the agents' risk-aversion characterization, which implies knowledge about prudent attitude. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1998) 23, 151–165. doi:10.1023/A:1008678228249
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 23 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK|
Web: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pal/subscribe/index.html Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Feldstein, Martin, 1988.
"The Effects of Fiscal Policies when Incomes Are Uncertain: A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 14-23, March.
- Martin Feldstein, 1986. "The Effects of Fiscal Policies When Incomes are Uncertain: A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence," NBER Working Papers 2062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jouvet, P-A. & Michel, P. & Pestieau, P., 1996.
"Altruism, Voluntary Contributions and Neutrality. The Case of Environmental Quality,"
96a32, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Jouvet, Pierre-Andre & Michel, Philippe & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "Altruism, Voluntary Contributions and Neutrality: The Case of Environmental Quality," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(268), pages 465-75, November.
- JOUVET, Pierre-André & MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality: the case of environmental quality," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1484, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- JOUVET, Pierre André & MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1996. "Altruism, voluntary contributions and neutrality. The case of environmental quality," CORE Discussion Papers 1996067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chichilnisky, G. & Heal, G., 1993.
"Global Environmental Risks,"
1993_03, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Kyle Bagwell, 1989.
"Is Everything Neutral?,"
NBER Working Papers
2086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marini Giancarlo & Scaramozzino Pasquale, 1995. "Overlapping Generations and Environmental Control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 64-77, July.
- Gollier, C. & Jullien, B. & Treich, N., 1997. "Learning and Irreversibility: An Econmic Interpretation of the "Precautionnary Principle"," Papers 97.470, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Kimball, Miles S & Mankiw, N Gregory, 1989.
"Precautionary Saving and the Timing of Taxes,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 863-79, August.
- Miles S. Kimball & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1988. "Precautionary Saving and the Timing of Taxes," NBER Working Papers 2680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kimball, Miles S. & Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1989. "Precautionary Saving and the Timing of Taxes," Scholarly Articles 3443105, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Kihlstrom, Richard E. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1974. "Risk aversion with many commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-388, July.
- Solow, Robert M, 1986. " On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(1), pages 141-49.
- Philippe Michel & Gilles Rotillon, 1995. "Disutility of pollution and endogenous growth," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(3), pages 279-300, October.
- Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
- Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
- John, A & Pecchenino, R, 1994. "An Overlapping Generations Model of Growth and the Environment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1393-1410, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:151-165. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Daniel Foley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.