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Legal institutions, political economy, and development

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  • Gani Aldashev

Abstract

This article reviews some of the recent literature on the relationship between the legal system and economic development. We also look at the historical, socio-cultural, and political factors that explain the differences in the characteristics of legal systems across countries and thus affect the link between the legal environment and economic outcomes. Although the field of law and economics of developing countries is still in its youth, it is growing rapidly and is a fertile ground for exciting new findings, both theoretical and empirical. Further progress in this field is likely to come from the studies of the elements of the legal system other than the substantive law (enforcement and dispute resolution) and should move beyond specific analyses of the impact of particular success or failure stories towards more general analyses of the determinants and outcomes of successful legal institutions. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Gani Aldashev, 2009. "Legal institutions, political economy, and development," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 257-270, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:25:y:2009:i:2:p:257-270
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oxrep/grp016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sujata Visaria, 2009. "Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, pages 59-81.
    2. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 285-332.
    3. Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & La Porta, Rafael & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Scholarly Articles 2962610, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Sonin, Konstantin, 2003. "Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, pages 715-731.
    5. Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2008. "Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 1197-1250.
    6. Matthieu Chemin, 2007. "The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's Access to Justice Programme," Cahiers de recherche 0727, CIRPEE.
    7. Rafael Di Tella & Sebastian Galiant & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2007. "The Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 209-241.
    8. Aldashev, Gani & Chaara, Imane & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2012. "Using the law to change the custom," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 182-200.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 949-995.
    10. Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2008. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(6), pages 981-1022, December.
    11. Brasselle, Anne-Sophie & Gaspart, Frederic & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2002. "Land tenure security and investment incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 373-418.
    12. Chemin, Matthieu, 2009. "The impact of the judiciary on entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan's "Access to Justice Programme"," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 114-125.
    13. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2005. "Unbundling Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 949-995.
    14. Sujata Visaria, 2006. "Legal Reform and Loan Repayment:The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-023, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    15. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 285-332.
    16. Sujata Visaria, 2006. "Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-157, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    17. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 903-937.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim Economides & Alfred A. Haug & Joe McIntyre, 2013. "Are Courts Slow? Exposing and Measuring the Invisible Determinants of Case Disposition Time," Working Papers 1317, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2013.
    2. Olivia D'Aoust & Olivier Sterck, 2016. "Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 25(3), pages 439-467.
    3. Antonio David & Fabiano Rodrigues Rodrigues Bastos & Marshall Mills, 2011. "Post-Conflict Recovery; Institutions, Aid, or Luck?," IMF Working Papers 11/149, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Masaru Inaba & Keisuke Otsu, 2016. "Regional Business Cycle and Growth Features of Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1005, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Ojo, Marianne, 2015. "Decentralisation and The Evolution of Common Law," MPRA Paper 65803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Peyrache, Antonio & Zago, Angelo, 2016. "Large courts, small justice!," Omega, Elsevier, pages 42-56.

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