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Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in sub-Saharan Africa

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  • Olivia D'Aoust
  • Olivier Sterck

Abstract

In many African countries, customary and statutory judicial systems co-exist. Customary justice is exercised by local courts and based on restorative principles, while statutory justice is mostly retributive and administered by magistrates' courts. As their jurisdiction often overlaps, victims can choose which judicial system to refer to, which may lead to contradictions between rules and inconsistencies in judgements. In this article, we construct a model representing a dual judicial system and we show that this overlap encourages rent-seeking and bribery and yields to high rates of petty crimes and civil disputes. We illustrate our predictions with examples from Uganda.

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  • Olivia D'Aoust & Olivier Sterck, 2016. "Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 25(3), pages 439-467.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:25:y:2016:i:3:p:439-467.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jackson, Emerson Abraham, 2020. "Importance of the Public Service in Achieving the UN SDGs," MPRA Paper 101806, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Jun 2020.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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