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The Boundaries Of The Firm. The Case Of Oil Industry In Romania

Author

Listed:
  • Dudian Monica

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics)

  • Trasca Daniela

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics)

  • Mitrache Andreea

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics)

  • Georgescu Adriana

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics)

  • Georgescu Adriana

    (Academy of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economics)

Abstract

The economic theory of the firm has met an exponential growth in the last decades different from the traditional neoclassical approach. In the first part of the paper we are skimming through the most spread approaches, namely the theory of incomplete contracts and evolutionary school. In the second part we apply the explications on integration provided by the economics of transaction costs with an example on the oil industry in Romania. A brief qualitative analysis reaches out the conclusion that cutting transaction and agency costs is one of the factors that leads to integration within the studied sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Dudian Monica & Trasca Daniela & Mitrache Andreea & Georgescu Adriana & Georgescu Adriana, 2008. "The Boundaries Of The Firm. The Case Of Oil Industry In Romania," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 2(1), pages 112-117, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:2:y:2008:i:1:p:112-117
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transaction Cost; Agency Theory; Oil;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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