IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nea/journl/y2013i18p35-60.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Analysis of the Short-Term Efficiency of Mechanisms of the Wholesale Electricity Market

Author

Listed:
  • Vasin, A.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

  • Daylova, E.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

The authors consider theoretical models for mechanisms of the wholesale electricity market. Among them: Cournot auction, first-price auction of supply functions, Vickrey auction, pay-as-bid auction, two-stage auction. Theoretical estimations of their short-term efficiency from social welfare viewpoint as well as prices of goods for consumers are compared with results of statistical researches. Some problems and prospects of the Russian electricity market pointed out.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasin, A. & Daylova, E., 2013. "Analysis of the Short-Term Efficiency of Mechanisms of the Wholesale Electricity Market," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 35-60.
  • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2013:i:18:p:35-60
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2013-18-35-60r.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mahenc, P. & Salanie, F., 2004. "Softening competition through forward trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 282-293, June.
    2. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David & Ralph, Daniel, 2013. "Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1509-1551.
    3. David M. Newbery, 1998. "Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 726-749, Winter.
    4. Green, Richard J, 1996. "Increasing Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 205-216, June.
    5. Moreno, Diego & Ubeda, Luis, 2006. "Capacity precommitment and price competition yield the Cournot outcome," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 323-332, August.
    6. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    7. Newbery, D., 2008. "Predicting market power in wholesale electricity markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0837, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    9. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    electricity markets; Cournot auction; supply function auction; Vickrey auction; pay-as-bid auction; forward market;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2013:i:18:p:35-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexey Tcharykov). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nearuea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.