IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance

  • Karpov, A.

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

This paper surveys models of cumulative voting in corporate elections that have appeared in the literature. The influence of cumulative voting on company performance and proxy contests is analyzed. The practical issues as well as theoretical aspects of cumulative voting are studied. The particular section is devoted to gametheoretical modeling of the cumulative voting for corporate directors.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2012-16-10-25r.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

Volume (Year): 16 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 10-25

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:16:p:10-25
Contact details of provider: Postal: Nakhimovsky prospekt, 32, Office 1115, 117218 Moscow Russia
Phone: +7 495 7189855
Fax: +7 495 7189855
Web page: http://www.econorus.org/english.phtml
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David Yermack, 2010. "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 103-125, December.
  2. Karpov, A., 2011. "A Model of Corporate Board of Directors Elections," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 12, pages 10-23.
  3. Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 1998. "On the uses of corporate governance provisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 347-371, December.
  4. Forjan, James M., 1999. "The wealth effects of shareholder-sponsored proposals," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 61-72, June.
  5. Bhagat, Sanjai & Brickley, James A, 1984. "Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 339-65, October.
  6. Jie Cai & Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, 2009. "Electing Directors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2389-2421, October.
  7. Gerald J. Glasser, 1959. "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(2), pages 151-156, January.
  8. Aiwu Zhao & Alexander J. Brehm, 2011. "Cumulative voting and the conflicts between board and minority shareholders," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 465-473, May.
  9. Dodd, Peter & Warner, Jerold B., 1983. "On corporate governance : A study of proxy contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 401-438, April.
  10. Kapelyushnikov, R., 2012. "Property Rights' Insecurity and Its Economic Effects: Russian Experience," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 150-153.
  11. Easterbrook, Frank H & Fischel, Daniel R, 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 395-427, June.
  12. Ernst Maug & Kristian Rydqvist, 2009. "Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 47-79.
  13. Ikenberry, David & Lakonishok, Josef, 1993. "Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 405-35, July.
  14. Heron, Randall A. & Lewellen, Wilbur G., 1998. "An Empirical Analysis of the Reincorporation Decision," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 549-568, December.
  15. Dolgopyatova, T., 2012. "Corporate Conflicts and Risks for Dominant Owners," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 158-160.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2012:i:16:p:10-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexey Tcharykov)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.