Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance
This paper surveys models of cumulative voting in corporate elections that have appeared in the literature. The influence of cumulative voting on company performance and proxy contests is analyzed. The practical issues as well as theoretical aspects of cumulative voting are studied. The particular section is devoted to gametheoretical modeling of the cumulative voting for corporate directors.
Volume (Year): 16 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Ernst Maug & Kristian Rydqvist, 2009. "Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 47-79.
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- Easterbrook, Frank H & Fischel, Daniel R, 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 395-427, June.
- Bhagat, Sanjai & Brickley, James A, 1984. "Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 339-65, October.
- Ikenberry, David & Lakonishok, Josef, 1993. "Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 405-35, July.
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