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Evasive shareholder meetings

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  • Li, Yuanzhi
  • Yermack, David

Abstract

We study the strategic scheduling of annual shareholder meetings. When companies move their annual meetings a great distance from headquarters, they tend to experience pronounced stock market underperformance in the six months after the meeting and announce earnings below expectations over the subsequent year. Companies appear to schedule meetings in remote locations when the managers have private, adverse information about future performance and wish to discourage scrutiny by shareholders, analysts, and the media. However, shareholders do not decode this signal, since the disclosure of meeting locations leads to little immediate stock price reaction. We find that voter participation drops when meetings are held at unusual hours, even though most voting is done electronically during a period of weeks before the meeting convenes.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Yuanzhi & Yermack, David, 2016. "Evasive shareholder meetings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 318-334.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:38:y:2016:i:c:p:318-334
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.02.001
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    Cited by:

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    3. Giuseppe Ianniello & Alessandra Stefanoni, 2023. "Corporate Profitability and Shareholder Meeting Participation in Italian Listed Companies," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 17(3), pages 1-26, February.
    4. Carosi, Andrea, 2016. "Do local causations matter? The effect of firm location on the relations of ROE, R&D, and firm SIZE with MARKET-TO-BOOK," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 388-409.
    5. Baochen Yang & Yifang Liu & Yunpeng Su, 2023. "Earnings communication conferences and post‐earnings‐announcement drift: Evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(2), pages 2145-2185, June.
    6. Gam, Yong Kyu & Gupta, Paramita & Im, Jieun & Shin, Hojong, 2021. "Evasive shareholder meetings and corporate fraud," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    7. Walid Cheffi & Sonia Abdennadher, 2019. "Executives’ Behaviour and Innovation in Corporate Governance: The Case of Internet Voting at Shareholders’ General Meetings in French Listed Companies," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 775-798, May.
    8. Kate Suslava, 2021. "“Stiff Business Headwinds and Uncharted Economic Waters”: The Use of Euphemisms in Earnings Conference Calls," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(11), pages 7184-7213, November.
    9. Wang, Qiong & Qiu, Muqing, 2023. "Minority shareholders' activism and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    10. Lee, Eugenia Y. & Ha, Wonsuk, 2023. "Electronic voting in shareholder meetings and the market value of cash holdings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    11. Erin E. Smith, 2019. "Are Antitakeover Amendments Good for Shareholders? Evidence from the Adoption of Antitakeover Provisions in the Post-SOX Era," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(04), pages 1-40, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shareholder meetings; Corporate voting; Corporate governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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