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Mutual fund board connections and proxy voting

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  • Calluzzo, Paul
  • Kedia, Simi

Abstract

We study fund-firm connections that arise when firm executives and directors serve as fund directors. We find that connected funds are significantly more likely to vote with management in proposals with negative Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations or low shareholder support. As our data show that management support does not exist either before connection formation or after its termination, this result is unlikely to be caused by omitted factors. Rather, the connected fund's voting patterns show independence from ISS recommendations and successful connected voting is associated with positive announcement returns, suggesting that connected fund support for management reflects information advantages. Lastly, we find that a fund family and firm are more likely to connect when the fund family holds a large stake in the firm and is geographically proximate as well as when it has a record of voting independently from ISS.

Suggested Citation

  • Calluzzo, Paul & Kedia, Simi, 2019. "Mutual fund board connections and proxy voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 669-688.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:134:y:2019:i:3:p:669-688
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.04.012
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    11. Farizo, Joseph D., 2022. "(Black)Rock the vote: Index funds and opposition to management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Proxy voting; Board connections; Mutual funds;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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