Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
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- Calluzzo, Paul & Kedia, Simi, 2019. "Mutual fund board connections and proxy voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(3), pages 669-688.
- Efrat Dressler & Yevgeny Mugerman, 2023. "Doing the Right Thing? The Voting Power Effect and Institutional Shareholder Voting," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(4), pages 1089-1112, April.
- Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Agarwal, Vikas & Jiang, Lei & Wen, Quan, 2020. "Why do mutual funds hold lottery stocks?," CFR Working Papers 20-08, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
- Bolton, Patrick & Li, Tao & Ravina, Enrichetta & Rosenthal, Howard, 2020.
"Investor ideology,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 320-352.
- Bolton, Patrick & Li, Tao & Ravina, Enrichetta & Rosenthal, Howard, 2019. "Investor Ideology," CEPR Discussion Papers 13633, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Patrick Bolton & Tao Li & Enrichetta Ravina & Howard L. Rosenthal, 2019. "Investor Ideology," NBER Working Papers 25717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wang, Xianjue, 2022. "Disloyal managers and proxy voting," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
- Dragana Cvijanović & Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, 2016.
"Ties That Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(6), pages 2933-2966, December.
- Cvijanovic, Dragana & Dasgupta, Amil & Zachariadis, Konstantinos, 2014. "Ties that bind: how business connections affect mutual fund activism," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119030, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Cvijanović, Dragana & Dasgupta, Amil & Zachariadis, Konstantinos, 2016. "Ties that bind: how business connections affect mutual fund activism," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65929, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Dragana Cvijanovic & Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos Zachariadis, 2014. "Ties that Bind:How business connections affect mutual fund activism," FMG Discussion Papers dp731, Financial Markets Group.
- Tang, Tingfeng, 2020. "Hedge fund activism and corporate innovation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 335-348.
- Jing Huang & Steven R. Matsunaga & Z. Jay Wang, 2020. "The Role of Pension Business Benefits in Institutional Block Ownership and Corporate Governance," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 1959-1989, December.
- Dimmock, Stephen G. & Gerken, William C. & Ivković, Zoran & Weisbenner, Scott J., 2018.
"Capital gains lock-in and governance choices,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 113-135.
- Stephen G. Dimmock & William C. Gerken & Zoran Ivković & Scott J. Weisbenner, 2014. "Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices," NBER Working Papers 20176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, 2017. "The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 89-102, Summer.
- Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2020.
"Blockholder voting,"
Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 695-717.
- Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2017. "Blockholder Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 11933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Calluzzo, Paul & Dong, Gang Nathan, 2014. "Fund governance contagion: New evidence on the mutual fund governance paradox," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 83-101.
- Agarwal, Vikas & Ma, Linlin, 2013. "Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 13-10, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
- Duan, Ying & Jiao, Yawen & Tam, Kinsun, 2021. "Conflict of interest and proxy voting by institutional investors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Jiekun Huang, 2023. "Thy Neighbor’s Vote: Peer Effects in Proxy Voting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 4169-4189, July.
- Nain, Amrita & Yao, Tong, 2013. "Mutual fund skill and the performance of corporate acquirers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 437-456.
- Agarwal, Vikas & Ma, Linlin & Mullally, Kevin, 2015. "Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 13-10 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
- Zhichuan Frank Li & Saurin Patel & Srikanth Ramani, 2021. "The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 715-737, December.
- Ashraf, Rasha & Li, Huimin & Ryan, Harley E., 2020. "Dual agency problems in family firms: Evidence from director elections," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
- Dressler, Efrat, 2020. "Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
- Hshieh, Shenje & Li, Jiasun & Tang, Yingcong, 2021. "How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records11We are grateful for extremely helpful comments from one anonymous referee, Antonio Bernardo, Audra Boone, Mark Garm," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
- Aneel Keswani & David Stolin & Anh L. Tran, 2017. "Frenemies: How Do Financial Firms Vote on Their Own Kind?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(3), pages 631-654, March.
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