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CEO reputation and shareholder voting

Author

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  • David, Thomas
  • Di Giuli, Alberta
  • Romec, Arthur

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of CEO reputation on corporate proxy voting. Relying on prestigious business awards (through which the CEO is elevated to superstar status) as salient shocks to CEO reputation, we find that shareholders in aggregate, and mutual funds in particular, are more likely to vote with management (i.e., against shareholder proposals) when the CEO is a superstar. We use a battery of matching procedures to mitigate the concern that these results are driven by selection. We further show that shareholder proposals, especially contested ones and those with positive ISS recommendations, are significantly more likely to fail when the CEO is a superstar. Our results suggest that investors are sensitive to the external appraisal conveyed by the superstar status and prefer not to oppose management.

Suggested Citation

  • David, Thomas & Di Giuli, Alberta & Romec, Arthur, 2023. "CEO reputation and shareholder voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:83:y:2023:i:c:s0929119923001256
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102476
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Superstar CEO; Business awards; Corporate governance; Shareholder proposals; Mutual funds; Mutual fund voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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