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Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors


  • Gerald J. Glasser

    (New York University)


Game theory may be used to describe and to analyze corporate elections which are based upon a system of cumulative voting. In these games a strategy is a partition of one's votes among a slate of candidates. A minimax strategy is such a partition which guarantees a voter a certain security level in terms of the number of directorships he can win irrespective of how his opponents vote. These minimax strategies, although not so called, are equivalent to decision rules on how to vote found throughout the literature of business organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald J. Glasser, 1959. "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(2), pages 151-156, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:5:y:1959:i:2:p:151-156

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. M. E. Salveson, 1956. "A Problem in Optimal Machine Loading," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 232-260, April.
    2. M. Beckman & R. Muth, 1956. "An Inventory Policy for a Case of Lagged Delivery," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(2), pages 145-155, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2017. "Ranking languages in the European Union: Before and after Brexit," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 139-151.
    2. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    3. Duane Cooper & Arthur Zillante, 2012. "A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 363-383, January.
    4. Altunbas, Y & Chakravarty, S P, 2000. "Proportional Representation in the Welsh Assembly," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 85-94, April.
    5. Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.

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