A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:56:y:1962:i:04:p:936-946_07 is not listed on IDEAS
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Tim R. Sass & Stephen L. Mehay, 2003. "Minority representation, election method, and policy influence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 323-339, November.
- Gerald J. Glasser, 1959. "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(2), pages 151-156, January.
- Tabarrok, Alexander, 2001. "President Perot or Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 275-297, March.
- Brams, Steven J. & Potthoff, Richard F., 1997. "Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options," Working Papers 97-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
More about this item
KeywordsCumulative voting; Generalized plurality voting; Laboratory experiment;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:150:y:2012:i:1:p:363-383. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .