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The Impact of the Choice of Evaluation Criteria and the Type of Tender on the Awarding Public Contracts (in the Case of Construction Contracts at the Local Level in the Czech Republic)

Author

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  • František Ochrana

    (Center for Social and Economic Strategy, Faculty of Social Sciences Charles University in Prague, Ovocný trh 3-5, 116 36 Praha 1, Czech Republic)

  • Kristýna Hrnčířová

    (Center for Social and Economic Strategy, Faculty of Social Sciences Charles University in Prague, Ovocný trh 3-5, 116 36 Praha 1, Czech Republic)

  • Michal Plaček

    (Center for Social and Economic Strategy, Faculty of Social Sciences Charles University in Prague, Ovocný trh 3-5, 116 36 Praha 1, Czech Republic)

  • Milan Půček

    (Center for Social and Economic Strategy, Faculty of Social Sciences Charles University in Prague, Ovocný trh 3-5, 116 36 Praha 1, Czech Republic)

Abstract

Public procurement may be examined from different perspectives. Using the Czech Republic as an example, this study is devoted to examining the impact of decisions made by the contracting authority regarding a public tender on the tender process itself and on the outcomes of the tender. The contracting authority addresses a number of decision-making issues regarding public procurements. For example, it needs to decide between two types of criteria (choosing between a single-criterion evaluation or rather opting for several evaluation criteria). At the same time, the authority is free to choose among different types of award procedures while adhering to certain restrictions imposed by the Act on Public Contracts. Using a sample of 1,027 construction work contracts awarded in the Czech Republic, the study examines, in more detail, the impacts of individual choices made by the contracting authority (namely the type of evaluation criteria chosen and the type of procedure for awarding contracts) on the estimated and final price of public contracts. Recommendations on how to streamline the process of public procurement can be drawn from conclusions from the empirical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • František Ochrana & Kristýna Hrnčířová & Michal Plaček & Milan Půček, 2015. "The Impact of the Choice of Evaluation Criteria and the Type of Tender on the Awarding Public Contracts (in the Case of Construction Contracts at the Local Level in the Czech Republic)," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 63(6), pages 2057-2065.
    • Handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2015063062057
    DOI: 10.11118/actaun201563062057
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    References listed on IDEAS

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