Discretion Rather than Simple Rules: the Case of Social Protection
We present a simple model of a benevolent government that provides insurance to risk averse individuals. As in macroeconomics, commitment to fully contingent rules is better than discretion, but when the government can only commit to simple rules, discretion may be the best available option. The model provides a simple albeit precise characterization of discretion and commitment to a simple rule in the context of social protection, showing when and why discretion may be better than commitment. We argue that the forces highlighted in our model can provide a rationale for several highly distortive policies often observed in the real world in weak institutional environments.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2014|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Constituyente 1502, 6to piso, CP 11200, Montevideo|
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