Discretion Rather than Simple Rules: the Case of Social Protection
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KeywordsDiscretion; Commitment; Simple Rules; Informality;
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-IAS-2015-01-19 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAM-2015-01-19 (Central & South America)
- NEP-LAW-2015-01-19 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2015-01-19 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2015-01-19 (Public Economics)
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