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Evaluation of tendered prices of natural mineral water, juice and non-alcoholic beer (public procurement research)

Author

Listed:
  • Nataša Pomazalová

    (Ústav sociálního rozvoje, Mendelova univerzita v Brně, Zemědělská 1, 613 00 Brno, Česká republika)

  • Zbyšek Korecki

    (Katedra logistiky, Univerzita obrany, Kounicova 65, 662 10 Brno, Česká republika)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate tender prices of chosen beverages according to public procurement based on secondary data analysis. The empirical results of analysis (t-test and F-test) show that average annual prices of these beverages are different and collected data are not included in the same sample. Tender prices are different in each year of observed years, although are based on public tender. Important evidence is that for the public tenders in the abroad is obligatory use of the Czech public procurement law. According to this act the base evaluation criterion is the lowest offered price. Data were collected during the years 2005-2009. This study deals with empirical approach, variability of prices of chosen beverages based on public tenders between the Czech Republic (Ministry of Defence) and local suppliers in Kosovo. Results show low variability of prices, which are based on public tender and legal approach, regulated public procurement. The research conclusion is the fact, that tender prices for piece of non-alcoholic beverage are less than 10 % from annual mean (pcs./CZK) of tendered prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Nataša Pomazalová & Zbyšek Korecki, 2011. "Evaluation of tendered prices of natural mineral water, juice and non-alcoholic beer (public procurement research)," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 233-240.
    • Handle: RePEc:mup:actaun:actaun_2011059040233
    DOI: 10.11118/actaun201159040233
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle, 2006. "Corruption in procurement and public purchase," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 867-885, September.
    2. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 221-241, July.
    3. Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Štěpán Veselý & Mirko Dohnal, 2012. "Decision making in goverment tenders: A formalized qualitative model," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 397-406.

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