A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games
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- Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2007. "Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 73-97, March.
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"Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?,"
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More about this item
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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