Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives
A version of the herding prediction model with a rational-expectations flavor is reexamined in the light of incentive theory. The welfare loss at the market solution with respect to the incentive-efficient solution can be decomposed into an information externality term minus an incentive cost term. It is found that the inefficiency of herding at the market solution is low when the cost of providing incentives is high. When the cost of providing incentives is low (and this happens when prior information is diffuse), the incentive-efficient solution approaches the team solution that fully internalizes the information externality. Then the herding problem at the market solution is at its worst.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 158 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lones Smith & Peter Sorensen, 2000.
"Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning,"
Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 371-398, March.
- Smith, L. & Sorensen, P., 1996. "Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning," Working papers 96-19, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Smith, L. & Sorensen, P., 1996. "Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning," Economics Papers 115, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521474009 is not listed on IDEAS
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques M, 1985. "On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Vives, Xavier, 1993.
"How Fast Do Rational Agents Learn?,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 329-47, April.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2010.
"A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1193, David K. Levine.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
- Gale, Douglas, 1996. "What have we learned from social learning?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 617-628, April.
- Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-66, October.
- Vives, Xavier, 1996.
"Social learning and rational expectations,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 589-601, April.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521479394 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vives, X., 1993. "Learning from Others," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 206.93, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200203)158:1_91:iehai_2.0.tx_2-_. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.