Entrepreneurship and Social Security
In an occupational choice framework individuals can either become entrepreneurs (risky income) or employed workers (safe income). Their choice is affected by the design of the pension system which discriminates between entrepreneurs and workers. We explore the comparative statics of several pension parameters on the occupational equilibrium, assess the normative properties of the equilibrium, and discuss some policy issues. We find that seemingly identical pension provisions may have quite different effects, depending on whether applied to entrepreneurs or to workers. Entrepreneurs and workers should be treated differently in social security schemes. No general rule that entrepreneurs need insurance for old-age income less (or more) urgently than workers can be established. Splitting wage-related social security contributions between workers and entrepreneurs is not welfare-neutral.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 57 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/fa|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pekka Ilmakunnas & Vesa Kanniainen & Uki Lammi, "undated".
"Entrepreneurship, Economic Risks, and Risk-Insurance in the Welfare State,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
99-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Ilmakunnas, P. & Kanniainen, V. & Lammi, U., 1999. "Entrepreneurship, Economic Risks, and Risk-Insurance in the Welfare State," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 453, Department of Economics.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995. " A Theory of the Welfare State," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 495-526, December.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1994. "A Theory of the Welfare State," NBER Working Papers 4856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995. "A Theory of the Welfare State," CEPR Discussion Papers 1278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Buchholz, Wolfgang, 1991. "Tax effect in general equilibrium models with uncertainty : A generalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 397-399, August.
- Kanniainen, V. & Vesala, T., 2000. "Enterprise Formation and Labor Market Institutions," University of Helsinki, Department of Economics 483, Department of Economics.
- Vesa Kanniainen & Timo Vesala, 2000. "Enterprise Formation and Labor Market Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 359, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1996. "Social insurance, incentives and risk taking," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 259-280, July.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 1995. "Social Insurance, Incentives, and Risk Taking," NBER Working Papers 5335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1996. "Social Insurance, Incentives and Risk Taking," Munich Reprints in Economics 19834, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1998. "What Makes an Entrepreneur?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 26-60, January.