IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v41y2012i4p303-319.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economics at the FTC: Drug and PBM Mergers and Drip Pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Howard Shelanski

    ()

  • Joseph Farrell

    ()

  • Daniel Hanner

    ()

  • Christopher Metcalf

    ()

  • Mary Sullivan

    ()

  • Brett Wendling

    ()

Abstract

Economists at the Federal Trade Commission pursue the agency’s competition and consumer protection missions. In this year’s essay, in antitrust, we discuss two recent mergers that involved Rx drugs: First, we describe key elements of the inquiry into the Express Scripts/Medco transaction in the pharmacy benefit management industry. Next, we analyze a merger that involved drugs that are used to treat patent ductus arteriosus: a condition that affects premature babies. On the consumer protection side, we discuss a pricing strategy—drip pricing—that involves the release of price information about a multi-part product over time as the consumer goes through the purchase process. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York (outside the USA) 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Howard Shelanski & Joseph Farrell & Daniel Hanner & Christopher Metcalf & Mary Sullivan & Brett Wendling, 2012. "Economics at the FTC: Drug and PBM Mergers and Drip Pricing," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(4), pages 303-319, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:303-319
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-012-9360-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-012-9360-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2018. "Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets," Chapters,in: Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, chapter 3, pages 40-74 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2009. "Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 427-452, March.
    3. Meghan R. Busse & Jorge M. Silva-Risso, 2010. ""One Discriminatory Rent" or "Double Jeopardy": Multicomponent Negotiation for New Car Purchases," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 470-474, May.
    4. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1979. "A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 851-858, August.
    5. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael Grubb, 2015. "Failing to Choose the Best Price: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(3), pages 303-340, November.
    2. Michael Salinger & Robert Levinson, 2015. "Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(1), pages 25-57, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:303-319. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.