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Mandated self-regulation: the danger of cosmetic compliance

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  • Paul Calcott

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Suggested Citation

  • Paul Calcott, 2010. "Mandated self-regulation: the danger of cosmetic compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 167-179, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:38:y:2010:i:2:p:167-179
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-010-9124-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aalders, Marius, 2002. "Drivers and drawbacks: regulation and environmental risk management systems," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35992, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Coglianese, Cary & Nash, Jennifer, 2005. "Management-Based Strategies for Improving Private Sector Environmental Performance," Working Paper Series rwp05-025, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Heyes, Anthony G., 1996. "Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 251-265, May.
    4. Karen R. Chinander & Paul R. Kleindorfer & Howard C. Kunreuther, 1998. "Compliance Strategies and Regulatory Effectiveness of Performance‐Based Regulation of Chemical Accident Risks," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(2), pages 135-143, April.
    5. Brent Hueth & Tigran Melkonyan, 2009. "Standards and the regulation of environmental risk," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 219-246, December.
    6. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Gabel, H. Landis, 1997. "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 331-346, July.
    7. Pfaff, Alexander S P & Sanchirico, Chris William, 2000. "Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 189-208, April.
    8. Parker,Christine, 2002. "The Open Corporation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818902.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shanti Gamper-Rabindran & Stephen Finger, 2013. "Does industry self-regulation reduce pollution? Responsible Care in the chemical industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 1-30, January.
    2. Wendy Mason Burdon & Mohamed Karim Sorour, 2020. "Institutional Theory and Evolution of ‘A Legitimate’ Compliance Culture: The Case of the UK Financial Service Sector," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 47-80, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Environmental management systems; Misrepresentation; D62; K32; Q58;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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