A note on providing public goods through voluntary contributions
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00154690
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- Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Van Long, Ngo, 2022.
"A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
- Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa & Ngo Van Long, 2022. "A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation," CIRANO Working Papers 2022s-01, CIRANO.
- Ralph Frasca, 1981. "Instability in voluntary contributions based upon jointness in supply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 435-445, January.
- Jeffrey S. Zax & Casey Ichniowski, 1991. "Excludability and the Effects of Free Riders: Right-To-Work Laws and Local Public Sector Unionization," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(3), pages 293-315, July.
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