China’s evolution toward an authoritarian market economy—a predator–prey evolutionary model with intelligent design
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Andreev, Vsevolod V., 2015. "Will there be a revolution in Russia in 2017?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 782-788.
- Yongjing Zhang & Mei Wang, 2014. "Towards Behavioral Political Economy of Institutional Change: With Field Facts from China," CESifo Working Paper Series 4956, CESifo Group Munich.
More about this item
KeywordsChina’s market miracle; Economic growth; Evolutionary-institutionalist perspective; Evolutionary game theory; Institutional change; Public choice; Transitional economics; C73; D73; O10; P26;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
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