Risk Management in Public–Private Partnership Contracts
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) allow private companies to build, own and operate public projects such as schools and hospitals on behalf of the public sector. PPP contracts commonly require the private agent to take responsibilities for the performance of the asset over a long term, at least for a significant part of its useful life, so that efficiencies arising from long-term investment and asset management can be realized. However, the evidence is finely balanced on the effectiveness of such initiatives in obtaining the intended goals. This brings to the fore the challenge of designing and implementing innovative partnership plans to manage public services more effectively. More emphasis needs to be placed on strategies for the transfer of risk for the successful conclusion of PPP contracts. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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References listed on IDEAS
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