Risk Management in Public–Private Partnership Contracts
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) allow private companies to build, own and operate public projects such as schools and hospitals on behalf of the public sector. PPP contracts commonly require the private agent to take responsibilities for the performance of the asset over a long term, at least for a significant part of its useful life, so that efficiencies arising from long-term investment and asset management can be realized. However, the evidence is finely balanced on the effectiveness of such initiatives in obtaining the intended goals. This brings to the fore the challenge of designing and implementing innovative partnership plans to manage public services more effectively. More emphasis needs to be placed on strategies for the transfer of risk for the successful conclusion of PPP contracts. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Volume (Year): 7 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/political+science/journal/11115/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Oliver Hart, 2003.
"Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(486), pages 69-76, March.
- Oliver Hart, 2002. "Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/061, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2001.
"Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1343-1372.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2001. "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 2725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- M.G. Pollitt, 2000. "The Declining Role of the State in Infrastructure Investments in the UK," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0001, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.