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Ownership Dynamics of REITs

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  • Robert Edelstein
  • Branko Urošević
  • Nicholas Wonder

Abstract

This paper studies the effects that benefits of control and moral hazard have on the evolution of large stakes in REITs. A large risk-averse shareholder trades off the net benefits of REIT business monitoring and control with the cost of bearing risk beyond the level compensated by the REIT return premium. In equilibrium, the large shareholder gradually adjusts his ownership shares level (as long as his marginal benefits from holding shares increase in his REIT stake) towards the long-run competitive equilibrium in which his marginal share valuation coincides with that of the market. Because of the moral hazard, such level of ownership (and monitoring) is, in general, inefficient. The speed of adjustment is positively correlated with the agent’s risk aversion and company volatility, and negatively correlated with his marginal benefits of control and beneficial monitoring effects. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Edelstein & Branko Urošević & Nicholas Wonder, 2005. "Ownership Dynamics of REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 447-466, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:30:y:2005:i:4:p:447-466
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-005-7016-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert H. Edelstein & Antoni Sureda-Gomila & Branko Urosević & Nicholas Wonder, 2010. "Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The Case of REITs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 57-90.
    2. Sprenger, Carsten, 2011. "The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 260-277, June.

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