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Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?

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  • John Wilson

Abstract

This paper analyzes the optimal nonlinear schedule of taxes and subsidies on remittances from emigrants. The analysis identifies conditions under which emigrants remitting small amounts of income face positive average and marginal subsidies on their remittances, whereas emigrants remitting relatively large amounts of income face positive marginal taxes. In this way, the tax system improves the distribution of income by indirectly taxing the “brain drain,” while simultaneously encouraging remittances that tend to go to low-income residents. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • John Wilson, 2012. "Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 539-553, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:19:y:2012:i:4:p:539-553
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-012-9237-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Connel Fullenkamp & Mr. Thomas F. Cosimano & Michael T. Gapen & Mr. Ralph Chami & Mr. Peter J Montiel & Mr. Adolfo Barajas, 2008. "Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances," IMF Occasional Papers 2008/001, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Freund, Caroline & Spatafora, Nikola, 2005. "Remittances : transaction costs, determinants, and informal flows," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3704, The World Bank.
    3. Wilson, John Douglas, 2008. "A voluntary brain-drain tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2385-2391, December.
    4. Mirrlees, J. A., 1982. "Migration and optimal income taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 319-341, August.
    5. Bhagwati, Jagdish & Hanson, Gordon H (ed.), 2009. "Skilled Immigration Today: Prospects, Problems, and Policies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195382433.
    6. Taylor, J. Edward, 1992. "Remittances and inequality reconsidered: Direct, indirect, and intertemporal effects," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 187-208, April.
    7. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(1), pages 81-110, January.
    8. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1976. "Taxing the Brain Drain," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 34-38, July.
    9. Emmanuel Saez, 2001. "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 205-229.
    10. Gordon, Roger & Li, Wei, 2009. "Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 855-866, August.
    11. Stark, Oded & Wang, Yong, 2002. "Inducing human capital formation: migration as a substitute for subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 29-46, October.
    12. J. Taylor & T.J. Wyatt, 1996. "The shadow value of migrant remittances, income and inequality in a household‐farm economy," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(6), pages 899-912.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy

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