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A voluntary brain-drain tax

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  • Wilson, John Douglas

Abstract

A major roadblock to the implementation of Bhagwati's proposal to allow developing countries to tax skilled emigrants residing in developed countries (the "brain drain") is the administrative problems associated with collecting this tax in the absence of developed-country cooperation. This paper provides a partial solution to these problems, involving the tax treatment of emigrants who return to their countries of origin. The tax system is structured so that returning emigrants who previously paid the brain-drain tax face lower tax payments than those who evaded the brain-drain tax. Given the expected value of this tax benefit, emigrants are willing to pay the brain-drain tax. In the basic model, a source country's optimal tax system includes this brain-drain tax and does not distort migration decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilson, John Douglas, 2008. "A voluntary brain-drain tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2385-2391, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:12:p:2385-2391
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(1), pages 81-110, January.
    2. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
    3. Gordon, Roger H, 1986. "Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1086-1102, December.
    4. Bhagwati, Jagdish N. & Hamada, Koichi, 1982. "Tax policy in the presence of emigration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 291-317, August.
    5. Wilson, John Douglas, 1992. "Optimal Income Taxation and International Personal Mobility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 191-196, May.
    6. Dustmann, Christian, 2003. "Return migration, wage differentials, and the optimal migration duration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 353-369, April.
    7. Wilson, John D., 1982. "Optimal linear income taxation in the presence of emigration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 363-379, August.
    8. Mirrlees, J. A., 1982. "Migration and optimal income taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 319-341, August.
    9. Wilson, John D., 1980. "The effect of potential emigration on the optimal linear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 339-353, December.
    10. Stark, Oded & Wang, Yong, 2002. "Inducing human capital formation: migration as a substitute for subsidies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 29-46, October.
    11. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 2004. "In Defense of Globalization: It Has a Human Face," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(6), pages 9-20, November-.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Richard M. Bird, 2014. "Global Taxes and International Taxation: Mirage and Reality," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1429, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    2. John Wilson, 2012. "Should remittances be taxed or subsidized?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 539-553, August.
    3. Wilson, John Douglas, 2011. "Brain-drain taxes for non-benevolent governments," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 68-76, May.
    4. Krieger, Tim & Renner, Laura & Ruhose, Jens, 2018. "Long-term relatedness between countries and international migrant selection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 35-54.
    5. repec:ilo:ilowps:486992 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Michael Clemens and Timothy N. Ogden, 2014. "Migration as a Strategy for Household Finance: A Research Agenda on Remittances, Payments, and Development- Working Paper 354," Working Papers 354, Center for Global Development.
    7. repec:ilo:ilowps:486369 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Domenico Scalera, 2012. "Skilled Migration And Education Policies: Is There Still Scope For A Bhagwati Tax?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 80(4), pages 447-467, July.
    9. Bandeira, Guilherme & Caballé, Jordi & Vella, Eugenia, 2022. "Emigration and fiscal austerity in a depression," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    10. Volker Grossmann & David Stadelmann, 2012. "Does High-skilled Migration Affect Publicly Financed Investments?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 944-959, November.
    11. Haupt, Alexander & Krieger, Tim & Lange, Thomas, 2013. "Education policy, student migration, and brain gain," Discussion Paper Series 2013-05, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    12. Guilherme Bandeira & Jordi Caballe & Eugenia Vella, 2020. "Emigration and Fiscal Austerity in a Depression," DEOS Working Papers 2035, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    13. Makulec, Agnieszka., 2014. "Philippines' bilateral labour arrangements on health-care professional migration : in search of meaning," ILO Working Papers 994869923402676, International Labour Organization.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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