Does seeing more deeply into a game increase oneâ€™s chances of winning?
The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both playersâ€™ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006
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- Binmore,K. & McCarthy,J. & Ponti,G. & ..., 1999.
"A backward induction experiment,"
34, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Nicholas McKinney, C. Jr. & Van Huyck, John B., 2007. "Estimating bounded rationality and pricing performance uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 625-639, April.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 138-146, November.
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