IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v62y2007i4p625-639.html

Estimating bounded rationality and pricing performance uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Nicholas McKinney, C. Jr.
  • Van Huyck, John B.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas McKinney, C. Jr. & Van Huyck, John B., 2007. "Estimating bounded rationality and pricing performance uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 625-639, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:62:y:2007:i:4:p:625-639
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(05)00254-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
    2. David I. Laibson & Xavier Gabaix, 2000. "A Boundedly Rational Decision Algorithm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 433-438, May.
    3. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    4. Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Baader, Malte & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2017. "Interaction of reasoning ability and distributional preferences in a social dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 79-91.
    2. McKinney, C. Nicholas & Van Huyck, John B., 2013. "Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 223-232.
    3. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2010. "Experience and insight in the Race game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 144-155, August.
    4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Sundaram, Ramya & Butler, David J., 2010. "Epiphany in the Game of 21," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 132-143, August.
    5. Flannery, Timothy & Roberts, Stephen, 2018. "The use of non-monotonic contracts in a single period game: An experimental investigation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 177-185.
    6. Kindler, A. & Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & Lefebvre, G. & Solomon, S., 2017. "New leads in speculative behavior," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 467(C), pages 365-379.
    7. C. McKinney & John Huyck, 2006. "Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(3), pages 297-303, September.
    8. Subhasish Dugar & Haimanti Bhattacharya, 2008. "The Power of Reasoning: Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2008_20, University of Utah, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Baethge, Caroline, 2016. "Performance in the beauty contest: How strategic discussion enhances team reasoning," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe B-17-16, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    2. Kirstein, Annette & Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Less Rationality, More Efficiency: a Laboratory Experiment on "Lemon" Markets," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    3. A. Arrighetti & S. Curatolo, 2010. "Costi di coordinamento e vantaggi di aggregazione: esiti, morfologia e processi di interazione in un mondo artificiale multi-agente," Economics Department Working Papers 2010-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    4. T. Ballinger & Eric Hudson & Leonie Karkoviata & Nathaniel Wilcox, 2011. "Saving behavior and cognitive abilities," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 349-374, September.
    5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Sundaram, Ramya & Butler, David J., 2010. "Epiphany in the Game of 21," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 132-143, August.
    6. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
    7. Bosch-Domènech, Antoni & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2013. "On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 52-67.
    8. Antonio Cabrales & Rosemarie Nagel & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 221-234, September.
    9. Sergeyev, Dmitriy & Iovino, Luigi, 2018. "Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies Without Rational Expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 13100, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    10. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2004. "Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000316, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. De Giorgi, Enrico & Reimann, Stefan, 2008. "The [alpha]-beauty contest: Choosing numbers, thinking intervals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 470-486, November.
    12. Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
    13. Lamar Crombach & Frank Bohn, 2024. "Uninformed voters with (im)precise expectations: Explaining political budget cycle puzzles," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 275-311, March.
    14. Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O., 2007. "Equilibrium selection and bounded rationality in symmetric normal-form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 98-119, January.
    15. Helland, Leif & Iachan, Felipe S. & Juelsrud, Ragnar E. & Nenov, Plamen T., 2021. "Information quality and regime change: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 538-554.
    16. Willemien Kets, 2014. "Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1569, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Peeta, Srinivas, 2016. "A marginal utility day-to-day traffic evolution model based on one-step strategic thinkingAuthor-Name: He, Xiaozheng," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 237-255.
    18. Mariano Runco, 2013. "Estimating depth of reasoning in a repeated guessing game with no feedback," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(3), pages 402-413, September.
    19. Selten, Reinhard & Abbink, Klaus & Buchta, Joachim & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2003. "How to play (3 x 3)-games.: A strategy method experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 19-37, October.
    20. Ardakani, Omid M., 2025. "Strategic information asymmetry in tail-risk markets," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:62:y:2007:i:4:p:625-639. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.