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Strategic Use of Environmental Information

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  • Geir Asheim

Abstract

Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information. Keywords and Phrases: Environmental regulation, voluntary contributions, moral motivation, hard information.
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  • Geir Asheim, 2010. "Strategic Use of Environmental Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(2), pages 207-216, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:46:y:2010:i:2:p:207-216
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9353-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Reeson & John Tisdell, 2010. "The Market Instinct: The Demise of Social Preferences for Self-Interest," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(3), pages 439-453, November.
    2. Johnson Kakeu & Erik Paul Johnson, 2018. "Information Exchange and Transnational Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(2), pages 583-604, October.
    3. Philippe Coent & Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2021. "Farmers Follow the Herd: A Theoretical Model on Social Norms and Payments for Environmental Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 287-306, February.
    4. Nyborg, Karine, 2011. "I don't want to hear about it: Rational ignorance among duty-oriented consumers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 263-274, August.
    5. Colo, Philippe, 2021. "Cassandra's Curse: A Second Tragedy of the Commons," MPRA Paper 110878, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Baddeley, M., 2011. "Energy, the Environment and Behaviour Change: A survey of insights from behavioural economics," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1162, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Prieur, Fabien & Zou, Benteng, 2018. "Climate politics: How public persuasion affects the trade-off between environmental and economic performance," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 63-72.
    8. Joachim Fuenfgelt & Stefan Baumgaertner, 2012. "Regulation of morally responsible agents with motivation crowding," Working Paper Series in Economics 241, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    9. Gardner Brown & Daniel Hagen, 2010. "Behavioral Economics and the Environment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(2), pages 139-146, June.
    10. Leimona, Beria & Lusiana, Betha & van Noordwijk, Meine & Mulyoutami, Elok & Ekadinata, Andree & Amaruzaman, Sacha, 2015. "Boundary work: Knowledge co-production for negotiating payment for watershed services in Indonesia," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 45-62.
    11. Tverskoi, Denis & Senthilnathan, Athmanathan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2021. "The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society," SocArXiv 24svr, Center for Open Science.
    12. Carmen Arguedas & Sandra Rousseau, 2021. "Energy-efficient design, consumer awareness, and public policy," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 231-254, June.
    13. Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2017. "On the impact of indirect competition for political influence on environmental policy," DEM Discussion Paper Series 17-16, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulation; Voluntary contributions; Moral motivation; Hard information; D11; H41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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